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Information in the Tails of the Distribution of
Analysts’ Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
Cameron Truong, Philip B. Shane, and Qiuhong Zhao
Investors generally measure earnings announcement news on the basis of the difference between actual earnings
and two salient benchmarks: earnings in the same quarter the previous year and a consensus drawn from a
distribution of forecasts by financial analysts. We evaluate the implications of a third salient benchmark: the
most optimistic forecast when actual earnings exceed the consensus and the most pessimistic forecast when
the consensus exceeds actual earnings. We find that considering the information in these tails of the distribution of analysts’ earnings forecasts enhances the profitability of post–earnings announcement drift strategies.

I

n our study, we investigated the stock price reaction to information in the tails of the distribution
of financial analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts.
As we know from the literature and the business
press, the market’s assessment of the news in a company’s quarterly earnings announcement depends on
the difference between actual earnings and two salient
benchmarks: actual earnings in the same quarter the
previous year and a consensus drawn from a distribution of analysts’ forecasts leading up to the quarterly
earnings announcement. In our study, we evaluated
the implications of a third salient benchmark: the most
optimistic forecast when actual earnings exceed the
consensus and the most pessimistic forecast when the
consensus exceeds actual earnings. We found that the
market absorbs some but not all of the information in
these tail forecasts; therefore, considering the information in the tails of the distribution of analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts enhances the profitability of
momentum trading strategies that are based on quarterly earnings news.1
We refer to the most optimistic/pessimistic forecast as the tail forecast and to the difference between
actual earnings and the tail forecast as the tail forecast error. We would expect the tail forecast error
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to contain incremental value-relevant information.
Let us assume that actual earnings beat (miss) the
consensus by a relatively large amount but that the
most optimistic (pessimistic) forecast is much closer
to or perhaps even above (below) actual earnings. In
that case, the consensus and tail forecast errors present
very different versions of earnings news, leading
us to predict a somewhat muted market reaction to
the traditional consensus-based measure of earnings
news. Now consider the case in which actual earnings differ from the consensus forecast by a similarly
large amount and the tail forecast is relatively close
to the consensus. In this case, the consensus and tail
forecast errors present largely consistent information, leading us to predict a stronger market reaction
to the traditional consensus-based measure of earnings news. Moreover, in a market that incorporates
information with a lag, we would expect a more pronounced post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD)
in the case of relatively more consistent consensus
and tail forecast errors.
Our empirical evidence suggests that the tails
of the forecast distribution contribute economically
and statistically significant information about the
quality of the traditional measure of earnings surprise.2 Using a sample of 126,205 company-quarters
from the first quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of
2012, we found that companies with large tail forecast errors in the same direction as the consensus
forecast errors experience significantly larger contemporaneous price reactions to consensus forecast
errors and a significantly larger PEAD. We found
similar results using tail forecast error in combination with unexpected earnings based on (1) a forecast
from a quarterly seasonal random walk time-series
model or (2) the stock price response around the
earnings announcement.3 Consistent with Livnat
© 2016 CFA Institute. All rights reserved.
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and Mendenhall (2006) and Lerman, Livnat, and
Mendenhall (2007), in our sample, a hedge portfolio
with a long position in stocks in the top quintile of
the distribution of forecast errors (based on expectations from both the seasonal random walk model
and the consensus analyst forecast) and a short
position in stocks with similarly derived bottom
quintile quarterly forecast errors generates a 2.41%
excess return in the next quarter. This hedge return
increases to 4.43% when the long (short) positions
are confined to stocks in the top (bottom) quintile of
the tail forecast error distribution.
Because we based all portfolio rankings on cutoff values from the previous quarter, our results are
free from look-ahead bias. Appendix A describes our
robustness tests, showing that our results hold after
controlling for various risk measures, proxies for
information uncertainty, transaction costs, and other
documented anomalies.4 As discussed in Appendix
A, we observed higher abnormal trading volume
after earnings announcements of companies experiencing larger tail forecast errors in the same direction
as the consensus forecast errors. All the evidence
points to the conclusion that tail forecast error captures substantial earnings information not captured
by conventional measures of earnings surprise.
Our results are of interest to both researchers and
practitioners. Researchers examining the contemporaneous/delayed market reaction to nonearnings
information while controlling for the contemporaneous/delayed market reaction to earnings information should use all three proxies for unexpected earnings described in this article to avoid understating
the market reaction to earnings news and overstating
the market reaction to other information (see, e.g.,
Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall 1992; Bhushan 1994;
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996; Collins and
Hribar 2000; Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky
2000; Mendenhall 2004; Francis, LaFond, Olsson,
and Schipper 2004). Our study also contributes to
the literature on analyst behavior and market efficiency in establishing that when tail forecasts deviate
significantly from the consensus, one observes less
underreaction to earnings news. For practitioners
who aim to exploit PEAD, using all three measures
of unexpected earnings helps generate significantly
larger excess returns with a more concentrated trading portfolio. Our study provides strong empirical
support for the practice of improving on consensus
forecasts to seek investable opportunities.5 Finally,
our findings offer further evidence that PEAD is
probably due not to researcher error in measuring
risk-adjusted returns but, rather, to economic or
behavioral analyst/investor biases (see, e.g., Raedy,
Shane, and Yang 2006; Cen, Hilary, and Wei 2013).
September/October 2016

Predictions
Measures of earnings news generally require two
inputs: a proxy for the market’s definition of actual
value-relevant earnings and a proxy for the best
expectation of those earnings. Several studies have
found evidence of both a contemporaneous and a
delayed market reaction to earnings news, calculated
as actual current-quarter earnings minus earnings for
the same quarter of the previous year (e.g., Freeman
and Tse 1989; Bernard and Thomas 1990; Chordia and
Shivakumar 2006). Other studies have used a consensus measure of analyst earnings forecasts from Value
Line or I/B/E/S to proxy for the market’s expectation
of actual value-relevant earnings (e.g., Abarbanell and
Bernard 1992; Chan et al. 1996; Shane and Brous 2001;
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Kasznik and McNichols
2002; Liang 2003; Mendenhall 2004; Ramnath, Rock,
and Shane 2005). Traditional measures of expected
earnings focus on measures of central tendency. In our
study, we focused on incremental information in the
tails of the distribution of analysts’ forecasts, defining
our scaled tail forecast–based unexpected earnings
measure, SUETAIL, as follows:
SUETAILit = (Eit – MAXit)/Pit × (POST)

+ (Eit – MINit)/Pit × (1 – POST),

(1)

where
MAXit (MINit) = 
t he maximum (minimum)
I/B/E/S analyst forecast in
the 90-day period before the
earnings announcement date
POST = a dummy that takes the value of
1 if the consensus forecast–based
unexpected earnings (Eit – Fit) is
greater than or equal to 0 and
takes the value of 0 otherwise
Eit = quarterly earnings per I/B/E/S
Fit = the consensus analyst forecast
We scaled the numerator by the price per share
for stock i at the end of quarter t. Equation 1 is best
illustrated with the following two examples.
Suppose that both Company A and Company B
have equivalent positive forecast errors (computed
by using a recent consensus of analysts’ forecasts)
but have different forecast errors computed by using
the most optimistic forecast in the distribution from
which the consensus forecast emerged.6
Although the two companies have the same consensus forecast errors (30 cents), the actual earnings
of Company B beat the most optimistic forecast by
29 cents whereas the actual earnings of Company
A beat the most optimistic forecast by only 5 cents.
Thus, one analyst managed to predict actual earnings very well for Company A, and that analyst’s
clients might act on this superior prediction before
the earnings announcement, leaving little room for
www.cfapubs.org
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Example 1. 
Company A
Earnings
Consensus earnings forecast
Consensus forecast error

1.00
0.70
0.30

Company B
Earnings
Consensus earnings forecast
Consensus forecast error

1.00
0.70
0.30

Earnings
Most optimistic forecast
Tail forecast error

1.00
0.95
0.05

Earnings
Most optimistic forecast
Tail forecast error

1.00
0.71
0.29

Example 2. 
Company A
Earnings
Consensus earnings forecast
Consensus forecast error

Company B
0.50
1.00
–0.50

Earnings
Consensus earnings forecast
Consensus forecast error

0.50
1.00
–0.50

Earnings
Most pessimistic forecast
Tail forecast error

0.50
0.45
+0.05

Earnings
Most pessimistic forecast
Tail forecast error

0.50
0.95
–0.45

additional price movement concurrent with the
earnings announcement. We hypothesize that the
positive consensus-based forecast error for Company
B conveys more positive earnings news than the
consensus-based forecast error for Company A
because, relative to Company A, Company B’s earnings beat the most optimistic forecast in the distribution by a much larger amount.
Changing Example 1 slightly, let us assume that
the most optimistic forecast for Company A is 1.05.
The earnings forecast error based on the consensus
(30 cents) would indicate a positive earnings surprise, whereas the earnings forecast error based on
the most optimistic forecast (–5 cents) would indicate
a negative earnings surprise. Here, the market may
be disappointed because actual earnings fall short
of the most optimistic forecast even though actual
earnings beat the consensus by a large margin.7
Now suppose that Company A and Company
B have equivalent negative earnings surprises (computed by using a recent consensus of analysts’ forecasts) but have different forecast errors computed by
using the most pessimistic forecast in the distribution
from which the consensus forecast emerged.
Although the two companies have the same consensus forecast errors (–50 cents), the actual earnings
of Company B fall short of the most pessimistic forecast
by 45 cents whereas the actual earnings of Company
A exceed the most pessimistic forecast by 5 cents.
Therefore, we conjecture that the negative surprise for
Company B conveys more negative information than
the negative surprise for Company A because, relative
to Company A, Company B’s earnings fall short of the
most pessimistic forecast by a larger amount. In fact,
86
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relative to at least one extremely pessimistic forecast,
Company B’s earnings news is positive.
Under these examples, our first hypothesis predicts that the magnitude of the market reaction to
earnings announcements characterized by positive
(negative) consensus forecast errors increases with
increases (decreases) in tail forecast errors that are
measured with respect to the most optimistic (pessimistic) forecast in the distribution from which the
consensus emerged.
Our second hypothesis evaluates PEAD as a function of earnings news. It predicts that the magnitude of
the drift in stock prices following earnings announcements characterized by positive (negative) consensus
forecast errors increases with increases (decreases) in
tail forecast errors that are measured with respect to
the most optimistic (pessimistic) forecast in the distribution from which the consensus emerged.

Research Design
We evaluated three measures of unexpected earnings in terms of their relationship with both the
contemporaneous stock price reaction to earnings
announcements and PEAD. Consistent with many
prior studies, we obtained our first measure of
unexpected earnings, SUE, from a rolling seasonal
random walk model. Our second measure, SUECF,
is based on the traditional measure of consensus
analyst forecast error from I/B/E/S, whereby unexpected earnings equals actual quarterly earnings less
the median forecast during a 90-day period leading
up to the earnings announcement. Our third measure, SUETAIL, is defined as in Equation 1. We scaled
all three measures by price as of the end of the fiscal
quarter to which the earnings announcement refers.
© 2016 CFA Institute. All rights reserved.
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To mitigate effects of outliers and nonlinearities,
we decile-ranked SUE, SUECF, and SUETAIL and
transformed the decile ranks to fall along a scale
between 0 and 1. To eliminate any look-ahead bias,
we used the ranking cutoffs from the previous quarter to assign stocks to one of 10 portfolios on the basis
of SUE, SUECF, or SUETAIL in the current quarter,
resulting in the rank variables DSUE, DSUECF, and
DSUETAIL. The advantage of this method is that by
regressing PEAD on these transformed variables, the
coefficients on DSUE, DSUECF, and DSUETAIL can
be interpreted as the return earned on an equally
weighted portfolio that takes long positions in the
top decile of the variable and short positions in the
bottom decile of the variable.
Our primary motivation for SUETAIL was to
provide information that supplements the information in SUECF or SUE such that the market reaction and PEAD associated with the interaction of
SUECF and SUETAIL or the interaction of SUE and
SUETAIL are stronger than the market reaction
and PEAD associated with SUECF or SUE alone.
Although our results confirm this prediction, we
also found that a hedge portfolio trading strategy
based on SUETAIL alone produces significant positive abnormal returns.
To examine the role of each surprise measure in
relation to the contemporaneous market reaction to
the news in an earnings announcement and PEAD,
we estimated the following models:
CAR i ,q = Intercept + a1 × DSUEi ,q + a2
× DSUECFi ,q + a3 × DSUETAILi ,q (2)
+u
PEADi ,q = Intercept + a1 × DSUEi ,q + a2
× DSUECFi ,q + a3 × DSUETAILi ,q (3)
+u
CAR is a three-day buy-and-hold excess return
surrounding each earnings announcement, and
PEAD is a buy-and-hold excess return from day +2
following the earnings announcement through the
day following the next quarter’s earnings announcement or through the day +100 when the date of the
next quarterly earnings announcement is missing
(Berkman and Truong 2009). Buy-and-hold excess
return is computed as the difference between raw
return and the return on a portfolio of companies
matched on size and book-to-market value.
To implement our tests of the hypotheses that
SUETAIL adds value in explaining both the contemporaneous market reaction to the news in an
earnings announcement and the drift in returns following the earnings announcement, we estimated
the following models:
September/October 2016

CAR i ,q = Intercept + a1 × DSUEi ,q + a2
× DSUE i ,q × DSUETAILi ,q + u
CAR i ,q = Intercept + a1 × DSUECFi ,q + a2
× DSUECFi ,q × DSUETAILi ,q + u
PEADi ,q = Intercept + a1 × DSUEi ,q + a2
× DSUE i ,q × DSUETAILi ,q + u

(4)
(5)
(6)

PEADi ,q = Intercept + a1 × DSUECFi ,q + a2

× DSUECFi ,q × DSUETAILi ,q + u (7)

We report our results from the regressions we
conducted, with standard errors of coefficients clustered by company and quarter (Petersen 2009; Gar,
Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010; Thompson 2011).

Results
We report and discuss our results with respect to
descriptive statistics, contemporaneous market
responses to earnings surprises, and market efficiency regarding the three earnings news proxies.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 1 outlines the
derivation of our sample and provides descriptive
statistics for variables included in our tests of hypotheses. Panel A shows that we began with all 1,649,763
company-quarters available from I/B/E/S from the
first quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 2012.
We then applied screens to reduce the number of
observations to those with the data needed to test our
hypotheses. First, we eliminated observations without Compustat data needed to calculate SUE (473,058
observations). Second, we excluded observations
without earnings announcement dates on Compustat
(224,089 observations). Third, we reduced measurement error by eliminating observations with earnings
announcement dates (per Compustat) that were not
within at least one day of the earnings announcement
dates available from I/B/E/S (146,181 observations).
Fourth, we eliminated observations without the necessary price deflator from Compustat or with a price
deflator less than $1 (40,944 observations). Fifth, we
excluded observations with missing book or market
values of equity or with book or market values less
than $5 million (75,959 observations). Finally, we eliminated observations for which we could not obtain
the CRSP data needed to measure CAR and PEAD
(516,128 observations) and observations concerning
companies without the cutoffs of SUE, SUECF, and
SUETAIL from the previous quarter (47,199). These
screens left us with 126,205 observations to include
in the tests of our hypotheses.8
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics of
the variables in the main tests of our hypotheses plus
the variable STD, which measures the dispersion in
www.cfapubs.org
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Table 1.  Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
A. Sample selection
All I/B/E/S company-quarters with consensus forecasts from Q1:1987 to Q2:2012
Exclude observations without Compustat quarterly data to compute SUE
Subtotal after merging with Compustat data
Exclude observations without earnings announcement dates reported in Compustat
Exclude observations where earnings announcement dates in Compustat and I/B/E/S differ by more than one
calendar day
Exclude observations where the price per share from Compustat at fiscal quarter-end is missing or less than $1
Exclude observations with market (or book) equity missing or less than $5 million
Subtotal: Number of company-quarters before merging with CRSP
Exclude company-quarters without matching CRSP data needed to compute CAR and PEAD
Subtotal: Number of company-quarters after merging with CRSP data
Exclude company-quarters without cutoffs of SUE, SUECF, and SUETAIL from the previous quarter
Number of company-quarters in the final sample

Variable
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
B. Summary statistics of key variables
SUE
126,205
–0.0011
0.2682
SUECF
126,205
–0.0013
0.0648
SUETAIL 126,205
–0.0017
0.0640
CAR
126,205
0.0026
0.0809
PEAD
126,205
0.0027
0.2158
MV(t – 1)
126,205 6,348.91
20,923.63
Price
126,205
31.1932
29.1912
STD
126,205
0.0477
0.2204
SUE

SUECF

C. Spearman correlations among key variables
SUE
1.0000
0.2986
SUECF
SUETAIL

10th

25th

–0.0222
–0.0039
–0.0038
–0.0799
–0.2201
182.49
7.8750
0.0057

–0.0045
–0.0004
–0.0009
–0.0324
–0.1025
450.67
14.7500
0.0100

SUETAIL

CAR

PEAD

Percentile
50th
0.0015
0.0004
0.0000
0.0014
–0.0044
1,295.13
25.8500
0.0212
MV(t – 1)

1,649,763
–473,058
1,176,705
–224,089
–146,181
–40,944
–75,959
689,532
–516,128
173,404
–47,199
126,205

75th

90th

0.0055
0.0017
0.0010
0.0375
0.0934
4,018.69
40.4000
0.0471

0.0170
0.0046
0.0033
0.0868
0.2143
12,840.20
57.9999
0.0968

Price

STD

0.2202

0.1266

0.0289

0.0393

0.1061

–0.0660

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

1.0000

0.4317

0.2978

0.0444

0.0113

0.0119

–0.0025

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.3774

1.0000

0.1969

0.0322

–0.0188

0.0358

–0.0926

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

CAR

1.0000

PEAD
MV(t – 1)
Price

0.0386

0.0072

0.0233

–0.0196

<0.0001

0.0103

<0.0001

<0.0001

1.0000

0.0393

0.0238

0.0038

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.1720

1.0000

0.6367

0.1126

<0.0001

<0.0001

1.0000

0.1373
<0.0001

STD

1.0000

the distribution of forecasts from which we derived
the median and tail forecasts for purposes of measuring SUECF and SUETAIL, respectively. Our primary
test variables—SUE, SUECF, SUETAIL, CAR, and
PEAD—have reasonably symmetrical distributions
around zero and substantial variability, because
the standard deviation of each distribution is large
relative to the mean of each distribution. The mean
88
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and median market values of equity are $6.35 billion and $1.30 billion, respectively. The mean and
median market values of the price deflator are $31.19
and $25.85, and the mean and median values of the
measure of forecast dispersion (STD) are 0.0477 and
0.0212. Thus, the distributions of the market values
of equity, price, and forecasts are all skewed to the
right, consistent with the literature.
© 2016 CFA Institute. All rights reserved.
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Contemporaneous Market Response to
Earnings Surprise. We report our results from
regressing CAR (–1, 1) against three measures of earnings surprise. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, threeday excess returns corresponding to the top decile of
earnings surprise exceed similarly computed returns
related to the bottom decile of earnings surprise by
7.17% if surprise is measured by DSUECF, 4.79% if
measured by DSUETAIL, and 2.96% if measured by
DSUE. The two-way-clustered t-statistics of the coefficients on the three measures are all highly significant.
As shown in the far-right column of Panel A
(model 2), all three earnings news proxies help explain
the variation in returns during the three-day window
centered on the earnings announcement. Although
DSUECF seems the best proxy, the other two measures contain information about the market’s earnings

Panel C of Table 1 shows that our three proxies
for unexpected earnings (SUE, SUETAIL, and SUECF)
are significantly but by no means perfectly correlated,
leaving plenty of room for each to provide incremental
information about the company’s earnings news. Panel
C also shows that each measure of earnings surprise
is significantly correlated with both contemporaneous
and future returns, providing evidence of contemporaneous market reactions to earnings news and PEAD
in our sample. SUECF has the highest correlation with
both CAR (–1,1) and PEAD, our new earnings surprise
proxy (SUETAIL) is second in both categories, and SUE
is third. As expected, STD (our measure of forecast dispersion) and SUETAIL are negatively correlated, making STD an important control variable in our robustness
tests. The Spearman correlation is about –9.26%, which
is highly significant but far from perfect.9

Table 2.  Regressions of CAR (–1,1) on DSUE, DSUECF, and DSUETAIL
(t-statistics in parentheses)
DSUE, DSUECF, and
Variable
DSUECF
DSUETAIL
DSUE
DSUETAIL (Model 2)
A. Regressions of CAR (–1,1) on the levels of DSUECF, DSUETAIL, and DSUE
Intercept
–0.0337
–0.0220
–0.0121
–0.0426
(–24.17)
DSUECF

(–19.48)

(–13.37)

0.0717

0.0605

(28.40)
DSUETAIL

(25.85)
0.0479

0.0220

(25.74)
DSUE
R2
F-value
p-Value
N

0.0784
8,172.72
<0.0001
126,205

(–26.89)

0.0360
3,640.65
<0.0001
126,205

(21.80)
0.0296

0.0066

(22.88)
0.0136
1,361.88
<0.0001
126,205

(5.60)
0.0858
2,967.63
<0.0001
126,205

DSUE and DSUE ×
DSUECF and DSUECF ×
Variable
DSUETAIL (Model 4)
DSUETAIL (Model 5)
B. Regressions of CAR (–1,1) on the interaction between DSUECF and DSUETAIL and the interaction
between DSUE and DSUETAIL
Intercept
–0.0102
–0.0315
(–11.45)
DSUE

(–23.05)

–0.0096
(–5.37)

DSUE × DSUETAIL

0.0633
(26.14)

DSUECF

0.0514
(21.06)

DSUECF × DSUETAIL
R2
F-value
p-Value
N

September/October 2016

0.0269
0.0350
1,813.19
<0.0001
126,205

(17.46)
0.0823
4,305.33
<0.0001
126,205

www.cfapubs.org
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surprise that DSUECF does not. There is a hierarchy
regarding the power to explain contemporaneous
market reaction: DSUECF is the strongest (coefficient
= 0.0605; t-statistic = 25.85), followed by DSUETAIL
(coefficient = 0.0220; t-statistic = 21.80) and then DSUE
(coefficient = 0.0066; t-statistic = 5.60).
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of estimating models 4 and 5—testing the hypothesis that
the contemporaneous market reaction to an earnings announcement increases with the magnitude
of the interaction between (1) DSUE and our new
measure of earnings surprise, DSUETAIL, and (2)
DSUECF and DSUETAIL. As shown in Panel B, the
interaction terms, DSUE × DSUETAIL and DSUECF
× DSUETAIL, are highly significant, suggesting that
the contemporaneous market response to consensus
analyst forecast errors or to time-series model forecast errors increases with the degree to which the
most optimistic/pessimistic forecast conforms to the
consensus. This result supports our first prediction.
Market Efficiency regarding Three Earnings
News Proxies. Table 3 reports the results of
regressing the PEAD against four measures of earnings surprise. Brandt, Kishore, Santa-Clara, and
Venkatachalam (2008) and Zhou and Zhu (2012)
documented that a trading strategy based on long
(short) positions in the top (bottom) quintile of stocks
sorted on abnormal earnings announcement returns
(EAR) earns significant abnormal returns in the post–
earnings announcement period.10 We thus included
EAR as the fourth earnings surprise measure, regarding the stock price response in the three-day window
surrounding the earnings announcement.
Coefficients on the earnings surprise proxies provide estimates of gains to a trading strategy taking
long (short) positions in stocks in the top (bottom)
decile of the earnings surprise proxy distribution.
From day +2 following the earnings announcement
through the day following the next quarter’s earnings
announcement—or day +100 when the date of the
next quarterly earnings announcement is missing—
the trading strategy produces an estimated 2.69%
return when surprise is measured by SUECF, 1.67%
when measured by SUETAIL, 1.30% when measured by SUE, and 2.34% when measured by EAR.
Model 3 in Panel A of Table 3 shows that DSUECF
and DSUETAIL contribute statistically significant
power in explaining the drift in returns following
the earnings announcement. The regression coefficients suggest that one could earn an approximately
3.41% quarterly return on a strategy that takes long
positions in stocks in the highest decile of all three
measures of earnings surprise and a short position in
the lowest decile of those measures. Our DSUETAIL
measure contributes a unique 0.65% abnormal hedge
portfolio return, which is 19% of the estimated total
90
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hedge portfolio return. For further comparisons, the
far-right column of Panel A shows that when all four
earnings surprise measures are included, DSUETAIL
retains its important contribution to the abnormal
hedge portfolio return.
Model 7 in Panel B of Table 3 shows that when
PEAD is regressed on DSUECF and the interaction of
DSUECF and DSUETAIL, we obtain a 1.73% abnormal return to a trading strategy based on long (short)
positions in stocks in the top (bottom) decile of SUECF
alone, which increases significantly to 3% (= 1.73% +
1.27%) when the strategy is confined to stocks also in
the top (bottom) decile of the SUETAIL distribution.
The coefficient on the interaction term is highly significant, with a t-statistic of 2.58 (p-value < 0.01). This
result confirms our second hypothesis, which predicts
that the amount of PEAD increases significantly with
the interaction of DSUECF (the traditional measure
of earnings surprise) and DSUETAIL (our new measure based on tail forecasts in the distribution from
which the consensus emerges). Model 6 in Panel B
confirms similar interactive power between DSUE
and DSUETAIL. The spread between companies in
the top SUE decile and companies in the bottom SUE
decile increases from –0.34% to 2.31% when the trading strategy is confined to companies also in the top
and bottom SUETAIL deciles. The interaction term is
highly significant, with a t-statistic of 5.53. The model
in the far-right column of Panel B shows that when
DEAR interacts with DSUETAIL, the spread between
companies in the top EAR decile and companies in
the bottom EAR decile increases from 0.86% to 3.28%.
Again, the interaction term is highly significant, with
a t-statistic of 5.18, providing further evidence of the
importance of DSUETAIL in assessing PEAD.
Table 4 reports our analysis of hedge portfolio
PEAD returns in relation to different combinations
of the three primary earnings news proxies. Panel A
shows our analysis of PEAD for various combinations of the DSUECF and DSUETAIL variables. We
obtain statistically significant hedge portfolio quarterly returns of 1.51%, 2.03%, and 2.17% with long
(short) positions in stocks in the top (bottom) quintile
of the distribution of SUECF while holding SUETAIL
constant. Thus, the average return to a SUECF-based
trading strategy that holds SUETAIL constant is only
1.90%, compared with 3.39% for a trading strategy
that takes long (short) positions in stocks whose SUE
and SUETAIL are in the top (bottom) quintile of their
respective distribution.11
Panel B of Table 4 shows hedge portfolio quarterly
returns of 0.78%, 0.65%, and 2.13% for long (short)
positions in the top (bottom) quintile of the distribution of SUE, with SUETAIL held constant. Thus, the
average return to a SUE-based trading strategy that
holds SUETAIL constant is only 1.19%, compared with
© 2016 CFA Institute. All rights reserved.
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Table 3.  Regressions of PEAD on DSUE, DSUECF, DSUETAIL, and DEAR
(t-statistics in parentheses)

Variable
DSUECF
DSUETAIL
DSUE
DEAR
A. Regressions of PEAD on the levels of DSUE, DSUECF, DSUETAIL, and DEAR
Intercept
–0.0109
–0.0058
–0.0037
–0.0089
(–2.59)
DSUECF

(–1.42)

(–0.64)

(–2.03)

0.0269
0.0167

–0.0196
(–3.04)
0.0186
(4.18)

0.0065

(5.63)

0.0052

(2.56)
0.0130

DEAR
0.0006
59.56
<0.001
126,205

0.0003
34.98
<0.001
126,205

(2.10)

0.0048

(1.91)

0.0015
151.54
<0.001
126,205

–0.0145
(–2.42)
(5.35)

DSUE

R2
F-value
p-Value
N

DSUE, DSUECF,
DSUETAIL, and
DEAR

0.0228

(6.37)
DSUETAIL

DSUE, DSUECF,
and DSUETAIL
(Model 3)

0.0042

(0.68)

(0.60)

0.0234

0.0165

(6.78)
0.0012
116.07
<0.001
126,205

(5.00)
0.0022
54.92
<0.001
126,205

0.0016
55.78
<0.001
126,205

DSUE and DSUE × DSUETAIL
DSUECF and DSUECF ×
DEAR and DEAR ×
Variable
(Model 6)
DSUETAIL (Model 7)
DSUETAIL
B. Regressions of PEAD on the interactions between DSUECF and DSUETAIL, between DSUE and DSUETAIL, and between DEAR
and DSUETAIL
Intercept
–0.0029
–0.0098
–0.0082
(–0.51)
DSUE

(–2.43)

(–1.88)

–0.0034
(–0.45)

DSUE × DSUETAIL

0.0265
(5.53)

DSUECF

0.0173
(3.66)

DSUECF × DSUETAIL

0.0127
(2.58)

DEAR

0.0086
(2.32)

DEAR × DSUETAIL
R2
F-value
p-Value
N

0.0242
0.0009
45.01
<0.001
126,205

3.22% for a trading strategy that takes long (short)
positions in stocks whose SUE and SUETAIL are in the
top (bottom) quintile of their respective distribution.
Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and Lerman et al.
(2007) suggested that using SUECF and SUE simultaneously results in the highest PEAD hedge return.
Following this suggestion, we restricted the sample
in Panel C of Table 4 to observations whose quintile
rankings of SUECF and SUE agree and assessed the
incremental effect of considering the quintile rank
September/October 2016

0.0016
83.36
<0.001
126,205

(5.18)
0.0016
80.54
<0.001
126,205

of SUETAIL. Holding SUETAIL constant, we found
significant returns to a trading strategy that takes long
(short) positions in stocks whose SUECF and SUE
are both in the top (bottom) quintile of their respective distribution. These quarterly returns are 1.38%,
2.36%, and 3.49%, respectively, when SUETAIL is in
the bottom, middle, and top quintiles of its distribution. Thus, the average return to a trading strategy
based simultaneously on SUECF and SUE that holds
SUETAIL constant is 2.41%. The hedge return jumps
www.cfapubs.org
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Table 4.  Post–Earnings Announcement Drift Based on DSUECF, DSUE, and DSUETAIL
(t-statistics in parentheses)
DSUETAIL
Lowest 20%
Middle 60%
A. PEAD based on DSUECF and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)
DSUECF
Lowest 20%

–0.0067
11,750

Middle 60%

(–1.27)
0.0069
10,885

Highest 20%

(1.45)
0.0083
3,137
(1.08)
0.0151

Hedge

25,772
(1.61)

–0.0056
9,680
(–1.23)
0.0001
60,220
(0.03)
0.0146
5,497
(3.12)
0.0203
75,397
(3.10)

Highest 20%

0.0053
4,112
(0.76)
0.0056
4,468
(1.23)
0.0271
16,456
(6.90)
0.0217
25,036
(2.68)

Hedge

0.0121
25,542
(1.37)
–0.0012
75,573
(–0.18)
0.0188
25,090
(2.17)
0.0339
126,205
(5.13)

B. PEAD based on DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)
DSUE
Lowest 20%

–0.0042
10,703

Middle 60%

(–0.64)
–0.0001
10,214

Highest 20%

(–0.04)
0.0036
4,855
(0.56)
0.0078

Hedge

25,772
(0.85)

0.0000
9,660
(0.01)
–0.0007
54,891
(–0.33)
0.0065
10,846
(1.56)
0.0065
75,397
(0.99)

0.0066
5,585
(0.92)
0.0147
10,282
(5.23)
0.0279
9,169
(5.51)
0.0213
25,036
(2.42)

0.0109
25,948
(1.12)
0.0150
75,387
(3.02)
0.0243
24,870
(2.95)
0.0322
126,205
(3.87)

C. PEAD based on DSUECF = DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 5,985)
DSUECF = DSUE
Lowest 20%

–0.0080
4,265

Middle 60%

(–0.86)
0.0145
969

Highest 20%

(1.58)
0.0057
617
(0.49)
0.0138

Hedge

5,851
(0.92)
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–0.0050
1,742
(–0.60)
–0.0012
10,648
(–0.50)
0.0186
1,150
(2.16)
0.0237
13,540
(1.97)

0.0013
1,284
(0.11)
0.0225
761
(2.81)
0.0362
4,549
(5.49)
0.0349
6,594
(2.54)

0.0094
7,291
(0.61)
0.0079
12,378
(0.65)
0.0304
6,316
(2.27)
0.0443
25,985
(3.85)
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to 4.43% with a trading strategy that takes long (short)
positions in stocks whose three earnings surprise measures are in their respective top (bottom) quintile.
Taken as a whole, the evidence in Table 4 strongly
suggests that tail forecast errors contain valuerelevant information to which the market incrementally underreacts, as indicated by the delayed returns
associated with SUETAIL in combination with the
two conventional measures of earnings surprise—
SUE and SUECF.12

Conclusion
Quarter after quarter, earnings announcements consistently rank among the most newsworthy information events affecting the value of companies’
securities. Effective proxies for earnings surprise are
important for at least two reasons. First, we have no
theory to guide measurement of the news the market
derives from an earnings announcement. Second, the
search for a proxy for earnings news that the market
fails to fully absorb leads to trading profits and, as
those trading profits are arbitraged away, to stock
prices that more efficiently absorb accounting information and allocate resources in capital markets.
Our study contributes a new measure of earnings surprise that affords greater understanding of
the process by which the market forms earnings
expectations. Our measure of earnings surprise
complements the news derived from two conventional measures: one based on consensus analyst
forecasts and the other based on predictions from
a seasonal random walk time-series model. We
found that when the most optimistic/pessimistic
forecast in the distribution of forecasts composing
the consensus is closer to the conventionally measured forecast, the market views the conventionally
measured earnings news as more persistent, reacting
more strongly in the three-day window surrounding
the earnings announcement but also underreacting
to this incremental information as reflected by significantly more PEAD.
Consequently, we found evidence of larger
hedge portfolio returns to trading strategies based
on long (short) positions in the top (bottom) deciles
and quintiles of conventionally measured earnings
surprise when these decile and quintile assignments are
similar to those based on our new measure of earnings
surprise. Appendix A shows that trading volume
around the time of the earnings announcement supplies corroborating evidence that our new measure
of earnings surprise provides heretofore uncovered
value-relevant information in earnings announcements and in the tails of the distribution of analysts’
earnings forecasts leading up to quarterly earnings
announcements.
September/October 2016

Moreover, we found that tail forecast error contributes unique information explaining both the market’s
contemporaneous reaction to earnings news and the
drift in returns after the earnings announcement. Our
results have implications for researchers seeking a better understanding of how the market forms its earnings
expectations, for investors seeking higher returns from
trading on the news in earnings announcements, and
for financial analysts seeking to improve their earningsbased research and recommendations. Overall, this
study improves our understanding of the process by
which accounting information affects market prices.
We appreciate helpful comments from Henk Berkman,
Charles Corrado, David Emanuel, Nam Tran, and
seminar participants at the University of Auckland,
Deakin University, Louisiana State University, Monash
University, and the 2009 Annual Meetings and 2010
Western Region Meetings of the American Accounting
Association. Philip Shane gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Frank Wood Accounting Faculty
Research Fund at the Raymond A. Mason School of
Business, College of William & Mary.
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Appendix A. Additional
Analyses and Robustness
Tests
In this appendix, we report additional analyses
and robustness test results regarding control variables, abnormal trading volume around earnings
announcements, and transaction costs, as well as
other untabled robustness tests.

Control Variables
The PEAD–SUE and PEAD–SUECF relationships
have been shown to be sensitive to arbitrage risk
(Mendenhall 2004), abnormal trading volume (Bhushan
1994; Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006), revenue surprise
(Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006), and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Dische 2002; Liang 2003; Garfinkel and
Sokobin 2006). Table A1 shows that the delayed market
reaction to the incremental information in SUETAIL
remains significant after the inclusion of these variables
as well as risk factors that might limit arbitrage trading.
As shown in Table A1, after adding these variables and allowing them to interact with DSUE and
DSUECF in the same manner as our variable of
interest, DSUETAIL, the coefficient on DSUE alone
becomes insignificant but the coefficient on the interaction of DSUETAIL and both DSUE (Panel A) and
www.cfapubs.org
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Table A1.  Determinants of Post–Earnings Announcement Drift
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
DSUETAIL
DREV
DARB
DEXP
A. Regressions of PEAD on DSUE and interaction of DSUE and DSUETAIL
Intercept
0.0010
0.0003
0.0008
0.0004
(0.16)
–0.0033

DSUE

(–0.39)
DSUE × DSUETAIL

DSTD

DP

DVOL

0.0006

0.0007

0.0004

0.0023

(0.05)
0.0090

(0.12)
0.0039

(0.06)
0.0124

(0.10)
0.0059

(0.11)
0.0160

(0.06)
0.0081

(0.34)
–0.0165

(1.10)

(0.27)

(1.23)

(0.62)

(2.26)

(0.81)

0.0226

(4.45)
0.0032

0.0130

(0.35)
DSUE × DARB

(0.75)
0.0114

0.0097

(0.64)
DSUE × DEXP

(0.49)
–0.0035

–0.0022

(–0.36)
DSUE × DSTD

(–0.18)
0.0086

0.0118

(1.49)
DSUE × DP

(1.70)
–0.0117

–0.0153

(–1.03)
DSUE × DVOL
94,479

94,479

94,479

94,479

B. Regressions of PEAD on DSUECF and interaction of DSUECF and DSUETAIL
Intercept
–0.0052
–0.0060
–0.0052
–0.0060
–0.0060
DSUECF
DSUECF × DSUETAIL

(–0.94)
0.0049

94,479

N

94,479

(0.49)
94,479

–0.0050

–0.0061

–0.0033

(–1.35)
0.0228

(–1.11)
0.0112

(–1.39)
0.0219

(–1.34)
0.0235

(–1.02)
0.0313

(–1.39)
0.0188

(–0.63)
–0.0033

(3.20)

(3.36)

(1.12)

(2.63)

(3.98)

(4.90)

(3.50)

0.0097

DSUECF × DREV

0.0127
0.0002

0.0150

(0.02)

(0.87)
0.0198

0.0178

(1.13)
DSUECF × DEXP

(0.96)
0.0022

0.0046

(0.16)
DSUECF × DSTD

(0.29)
–0.0009

0.0057

(–0.15)
DSUECF × DP

(0.77)
–0.0206

–0.0214

(–1.44)
DSUECF × DVOL

(–1.12)
0.0086

94,479

94,479

94,479

DSUECF (Panel B) is virtually unaffected and remains
significant.13

Abnormal Trading Volume around
Earnings Announcements
In addition to stock price changes, prior literature
has analyzed trading volume as a measure of the
www.cfapubs.org

(–0.15)
(2.45)

DSUECF × DARB

94

0.0027
(0.17)
94,479

(–1.22)
0.0157

(1.93)

N

(–0.63)
0.0242

(4.47)
DSUE × DREV

Full Model

94,479

94,479

94,479

(0.92)
94,479

0.0043
(0.28)
94,479

market’s response to information events, including earnings announcements. Table A2 examines
whether abnormal trading in the earnings announcement window is related to earnings information
captured by SUETAIL. Table A2 shows that trading volume is high (low) when the information in
SUETAIL corroborates (contradicts) the information
in the SUE and SUECF signals.
© 2016 CFA Institute. All rights reserved.
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Table A2.  Abnormal Trading Volume around Earnings Announcement Date Based on DSUECF,
DSUE, and DSUETAIL
(t-statistics in parentheses)
DSUETAIL
Lowest 20%
Middle 60%
Highest 20%
A. Abnormal trading volume based on DSUECF and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)

Highest 20% – Lowest 20%

DSUECF
Lowest 20%

1.2838

0.8805

0.6471

–0.6367

Middle 60%

(22.13)
0.5785

(22.44)
0.7126

(16.67)
0.7121

(–9.10)
0.1335

Highest 20%

(18.61)
0.5834

(28.83)
0.7737

(20.84)
0.9187

(2.89)
0.3353

(17.76)

(13.80)

(28.27)

(7.26)

B. Abnormal trading volume based on DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)
DSUE
Lowest 20%

0.9817

0.6930

0.7153

–0.2664

Middle 60%

(23.78)
0.8495

(22.93)
0.7420

(15.82)
0.7916

(–4.35)
–0.0579

Highest 20%

(19.43)
0.7677

(28.84)
0.7959

(24.31)
0.9659

(–1.06)
0.1982

(19.73)

(25.68)

(24.24)

(3.56)

C. Abnormal trading volume based on DSUECF = DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 25,985)
DSUECF = DSUE
Lowest 20%

1.3382

0.7154

0.6509

–0.6873

Middle 60%

(16.41)
0.6363

(15.29)
0.6997

(11.03)
0.6960

(–6.81)
0.0597

Highest 20%

(7.82)
0.5909

(23.87)
0.7414

(12.17)
1.0047

(0.60)
0.4138

(9.31)

(15.75)

(22.16)

(5.34)

Transaction Costs
Table A3 reports the implications of transaction costs
for trading on the PEAD. In Panel A, companies in
the bottom 20% of both SUECF and SUETAIL have
an average market capitalization of $2.06 billion,
whereas companies in the top 20% of both SUECF
and SUETAIL have an average market capitalization
of $2.78 billion. In Panel B, companies in the bottom
20% of both SUE and SUETAIL have an average market capitalization of $2.43 billion, whereas companies
in the top 20% of both SUE and SUETAIL have an
average market capitalization of $2.76 billion. In
Panel C, companies in the bottom 20% of all three
earnings surprise measures have an average market
capitalization of about $1.27 billion. Companies in
the top 20% of all three earnings surprise measures
have an average market capitalization of about $2.46
billion. Given that the average market capitalization of the overall sample is $6.3 billion (Table 1),
smaller stocks tend to occupy the trading portfolios,
but these stocks are not so small as to suggest insurmountable liquidity constraints. Average turnover,
measured as trading volume on day +2 relative to
September/October 2016

total shares outstanding, is generally more than 1%
across all three panels, which also suggests adequate
liquidity for trading these companies.
To account for transaction costs and to elicit
investable returns, Table A3 also examines PEAD
returns after accounting for transaction costs.
Following Chung and Zhang (2014), we used daily
closing bid and ask prices to compute the daily
quoted spread for each stock, and following Battalio
and Mendenhall (2011), we assumed that investors
pay half of the stock’s quoted bid–ask spread when
initiating their positions (on day +2) and again pay
half the quoted bid–ask spread when terminating
the positions. After accounting for transaction costs,
the hedge returns are 2.09% in Panel A and 2.05% in
Panel B. These returns are significant at the 1% level
and are economically large. In Panel C, the hedge
return after transaction costs is highest at 3.19%
and significant at the 1% level. In short, the PEAD
strategies are still highly profitable after accounting
for transaction costs, and the PEAD strategy that
combines SUECF, SUE, and SUETAIL is the most
profitable.
www.cfapubs.org
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Table A3.  Average Market Capitalization, Turnover, and PEAD after Transaction
Costs for Portfolios Based on DSUECF, DSUE, and DSUETAIL
Average Market Capitalization
Average
PEAD after Transaction
(millions of dollars)
Turnover
Costs
A. Market capitalization, turnover, and PEAD after transaction costs for stocks from 20% bottom
(short) and 20% top (long) of both DSUECF and SUETAIL
Short
2,060
0.0126
–0.0006
Long
2,775
0.0133
0.0203
Hedge

0.0209**

t-Statistic

3.30

B. Market capitalization, turnover, and PEAD after transaction costs for stocks from 20% bottom
(short) and 20% top (long) of both DSUE and SUETAIL
Short
2,432
0.0132
0.0003
Long
2,762
0.0146
0.0208
Hedge

0.0205*

t-Statistic

2.54

C. Market capitalization, turnover, and PEAD after transaction costs for stocks from 20% bottom
(short) and 20% top (long) of SUECF, SUE, and SUETAIL simultaneously
Short
1,268
0.0142
–0.0025
Long
2,460
0.0152
0.0294
Hedge

0.0319**

t-Statistic

2.86

*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.

Other Untabled Robustness
Tests
We also report other untabled robustness test results
regarding opposite signs between SUETAIL and
SUECF, the staleness of the consensus forecast, the
exclusion of extreme returns, SUETAIL and forecast dispersion, truncated tail forecasts, and annual
performance.

Opposite Signs between SUETAIL
and SUECF
As explained earlier, consensus forecast errors can
have opposite signs from tail forecast errors. Out of
our entire sample of 126,205 observations, we found
21,827 instances (17% of the entire sample) where
SUECF is positive and SUETAIL is negative and
13,863 instances (11% of the entire sample) where
SUECF is negative and SUETAIL is positive.
These cases emphasize the fact that SUETAIL does
indeed capture unique information that differs from
that captured by SUECF. To assess the validity of this
statement, we ran the regression represented by the first
model in Panel B of Table 3 and substituted a dummy
variable for DSUETAIL, whereby the dummy takes on
a value of 1 when SUECF and SUETAIL have opposite
signs and 0 otherwise. As expected, we found the coefficient on that variable to be significantly negative.
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Zhou and Shon (2013) showed that for a significant
portion of the population, an earnings surprise based
on the consensus forecast is met with market reaction in
the opposite direction of the surprise. We show another
dimension that can, at least partially, explain why stock
price may drop/rise on a positive/negative earnings
surprise based on consensus forecasts.

Staleness of Consensus Forecast
The consensus forecast may be stale because of several
old forecasts in the distribution, which raises the question of whether information in the tails of the forecast
distribution is incremental information or whether
such information comes from more recent forecasts. To
address this concern, we investigated whether tail forecasts provide incremental information relative to the
most recent forecast. In doing so, we computed SUECF
using the most recent forecast (instead of the median),
and we redid our main analysis with SUETAIL as the
interactive variable. We documented the significant
interactive effects of SUETAIL on CAR and SUECF
and on PEAD and SUECF. Hence, the incremental
information from SUETAIL is not due to staleness in
the consensus forecast.

Exclusion of Extreme Returns
We excluded observations in the most extreme positive and negative 0.5% of PEAD and CAR (–1, 1), and
© 2016 CFA Institute. All rights reserved.
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our inferences remain unchanged. In fact, t-statistics
are somewhat higher because the independent variables are less noisy. In addition, we excluded 11,250
company-quarter observations with only two identical earnings forecasts in the 90-day period before
the earnings announcement date, and our results
remain robust.

SUETAIL and Forecast Dispersion
To show that our new measure of earnings news
captures information different from that of earnings
forecast dispersion, we substituted STD for SUE in
Table 4. Holding SUETAIL constant, we found significant returns to a trading strategy that takes long
(short) positions in stocks whose SUECF and STD are
both in the top (bottom) quintile of their respective
distribution. These quarterly returns are 3.5%, 2.3%,
and 2.1%, respectively, when SUETAIL is in the bottom, middle, and top quintiles of its distribution. The
hedge return jumps to 4.4% with a trading strategy
that takes long (short) positions in stocks whose three
variables are in their respective top (bottom) quintile.

Truncated Tail Forecasts
In another robustness test, we replaced tail forecasts
with the 10th percentile and 90th percentile values
from the latest forecast distribution. We required at
least 10 latest forecasts for an earnings announcement, which substantially reduced the sample size
to 19,490 qualifying observations. This smaller
sample is potentially important for two reasons.
First, a single tail forecast may be due to noise or

luck. Substituting the forecast at the 10th or 90th
percentile captures a more general phenomenon of
10% of the analysts having forecasts that are some
distance removed from the consensus. As this distance increases, the quality of the consensus as a
proxy for market expectations diminishes. Second,
the smaller sample has practical implications from
the perspective of large funds that confine their
investment strategies to large-cap stocks followed
by more sell-side analysts. Using the 10th and 90th
percentile values to compute SUETAIL and replicating the main tests of our study, we found that the
results are almost identical to the results for the full
sample, with no inferences changed.

Annual Performance
We examined the profitability of trading strategies
on an annual basis and found that trading strategies
corresponding to the PEAD associated with priorquarter earnings surprises are consistently profitable year after year throughout our 26-year sample
period. The hedge portfolios based on long (short)
positions in the top (bottom) quintile of the SUE
distribution produce positive excess returns in all
years except 2001, 2008, and 2009. When the hedge
portfolios combine information from SUETAIL by
restricting the observations to those with SUETAIL
also in the top (bottom) quintile of its distribution,
trading profits increase in every year. We found similar evidence with respect to combinations of SUECF
and SUETAIL and with respect to combinations of all
three variables: SUE, SUECF, and SUETAIL.

Notes
1. Media reports of companies’ quarterly earnings generally
include GAAP and non-GAAP measures of actual earnings for
both the current quarter and the same quarter of the previous
year, along with a consensus of analyst forecasts taken from a
data aggregator, such as Thomson Reuters. Data aggregators
maintain or contribute to freely and easily accessible websites
with the high and low estimates in the distribution of forecasts from which the consensus emerges (e.g., Reuters, Yahoo!
Finance). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first
to rigorously analyze the information content of quarterly
earnings forecasts in the tails of the distribution.
Note that we use the terms earnings news, earnings surprise, unexpected earnings, and forecast error interchangeably
in this article.
2. In our study, we identified an approach that improves on the
consensus forecast in judging the information content of earnings announcements. This approach is consistent with Beckers,
Steliaros, and Thomson (2004), who found that active portfolio
managers and especially buy-side analysts seek to improve on
consensus forecasts in identifying investment opportunities.
3. Consistent with prior literature, we defined earnings surprise
(based on a rolling seasonal random walk) as the difference
between actual earnings for the current fiscal quarter and
actual earnings for the same fiscal quarter of the previous
fiscal year.
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4. Several studies have documented that transaction costs are
the main impediment to arbitraging PEAD (see, e.g., Ng,
Rusticus, and Verdi 2008; Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and
Shivakumar 2009) and that information risk mutes the stock
price response to earnings information (Yan and Zhao 2011),
leading to a more pronounced PEAD. In our study, using the
best estimate of transaction costs (Chung and Zhang 2014)
and usual proxies for information risk, such as analyst forecast
dispersion and stock return volatility (Zhang 2006), we documented that PEAD, especially PEAD based on multiple unexpected earnings proxies, is not fully explained by transaction
costs or information risk. These findings are consistent with
Battalio and Mendenhall (2011) and Yan and Zhao (2011), who
documented that PEAD-based trading strategies are highly
profitable after accounting for transaction costs and information risk.
5. Researchers analyzing minimum and maximum values have
found many effective applications. In a capital market context,
George and Hwang (2004) demonstrated the profitability of
momentum trading strategies timed to buy (sell) stocks when
they reach the new 52-week high (low) point. Although investors had already been using that information to inform their
trading decisions, George and Hwang provided the first largesample scientific evidence of the importance of that widely
available statistic. In a similar vein, our study provides the
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6.
7.

8.

9.

first large-sample scientific evidence of the importance of earnings news based on broadly available high- and low-earnings
forecasts.
Although in our examples we ignored the scalar for brevity,
in our empirical tests, we scaled all variables as described in
Equation 1.
Zhou and Shon (2013) documented that more than 40% of
earnings surprises are met by opposite-direction stock price
reactions, suggesting that consensus forecasts are not necessarily good proxies for the “true” market expectations. Our
example illustrates, at least partially, why the market may
react in the opposite direction of a positive earnings surprise
based on the consensus forecast, emphasizing the need to go
beyond the usual assumption of consensus forecasts as the
best proxies for market expectations.
Our results are not unduly influenced by any particular
industry. The sample includes 16 SIC code–defined industries,
with the smallest (largest) representation from agriculture
(financial services) at 0.17% (17.78%). More importantly, no
single industry is unevenly split between the top and bottom
deciles of SUECF or SUETAIL. For example, 17.46% (18.11%)
of the observations in the top (bottom) decile of the SUETAIL
distribution are from the financial services industry.
For our assessment of the robustness of our main results to the
inclusion of this and other control variables, see Appendix A.

10. Brandt et al. (2008) derived EAR in the same way that we
derived CAR (–1,1).
11. Another way to look at how the tail forecast informs a momentum trader is to consider what happens if the investor/analyst
ignores the information in SUETAIL and takes long (short)
positions in stocks with large (small) SUECF and small (large)
SUETAIL. In that case, the hedge portfolio return is a statistically insignificant 0.83% – 0.53% = 0.3%. Thus, large positive
(or negative) consensus forecast errors do not justify a trading
strategy that ignores the information in the tail of the distribution from which the consensus emerges.
12. Holding SUETAIL constant and consistent with Brandt et
al. (2008), we found significant returns to a trading strategy
that takes long (short) positions in stocks whose SUECF and
EAR are both in the top (bottom) quintile of their respective
distribution. These quarterly returns are 1.7%, 3.1%, and 3.4%,
respectively, when SUETAIL is in the bottom, middle, and top
quintiles of its distribution—or 2.7%, on average. The hedge
return jumps to 5.4% with a trading strategy that takes long
(short) positions in stocks whose three earnings surprise measures are in their respective top (bottom) quintile.
13. In an alternative specification, we added control variables used
in Mendenhall’s (2004) PEAD determinant model. Specifically,
our results are robust to controls for the percentage of institutional ownership and the number of analyst forecasts.
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